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This	paper	applies	a	stochastic	cost	frontier	model	to	a	panel	of	54	major	airports	over	2002-2008	
to	examine	how	the	two	dominant	governance	forms	of	publicly	owned	airports	in	the	United	States	
and	Canada,	namely,	operation	and	governance	by	a	government	(city,	county,	or	state)	branch,	
or	by	an	airport	authority,	affect	airport	efficiency	performance.		Our	key	findings	are	(a)	airports	
operated	by	an	airport	authority	achieve	higher	cost	efficiency	(on	average,	14%	higher	technical	
efficiency)	 than	 those	operated	by	a	government	branch;	 (b)	airports	operated	by	a	government	
branch	have	 lower	 labor	share	 than	 those	operated	by	an	airport	authority;	and	 (c)	 there	 is	no	
statistically	significant	difference	in	the	efficiency	performance	between	airports	operated	by	U.S.	
airport	authorities	and	Canadian	airport	authorities.	
INTRODUCTION 
Since the UK government began to privatize its airports in 1987, a great diversity has emerged 
in the ways in which countries tackle airport ownership and governance issues. In Europe and 
Australia, many airports have been fully or partially privatized and put under different regulatory 
regimes.  However, in Canada and the United States (henceforth referred to as “North America” 
for convenience), despite a long tradition of privately owned utilities and transport industries, the 
majority of commercial airports are still publicly owned and mostly operated either by a government 
branch (city, county, or state governments) or an airport authority, which is a quasi-governmental 
organization.
Despite the uniqueness of the North American airport governance structures, few studies have 
investigated their effects on airport efficiency performance. Many studies, including Barros and Dieke 
(2007), Oum et al. (2004), Oum et al. (2006), Oum et al. (2008) and Vasigh and Gorjidooz (2006), 
have focused on the effects of ownership forms and/or regulatory policies on airport efficiency. 
Indeed, there has been little research about the way in which different governance structures affect 
airport efficiency or productivity performance. Furthermore, very few studies have focused solely 
on measuring and comparing the effects of airport governance forms on the efficiency performance 
of North American airports.
In addition, the literature on airport governance structures provides few concrete, quantitative 
analyses of how different governance structures affect airport efficiency or productivity. Especially 
in North America, there has been no consensus so far as to which airport governance structure is 
better to foster efficiency.  Therefore, this paper seeks to find empirical evidence on comparative 
efficiency performance by the two most widely used airport governance structures in North America: 
an airport authority vs. a government branch.
To achieve these objectives, we estimate a stochastic cost frontier model using an unbalanced 
panel data of 54 airports over the 2002-2008 period. Our model will allow us not only to measure 
the unobserved airport inefficiency, but also allow us to study how much of the inefficiencies are 
attributable to the different airport governance forms. We employ a parametric method to measure 
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efficiency in order to identify the direction of a potentially non-neutral input-augmenting production 
structure being employed by the airports operated by the two distinct governance structures.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In the second section, we summarize literature on 
the effects of ownership and governance forms on airport efficiency. This section also summarizes 
the fundamental characteristics of airport governance forms adopted in North America. The 
third section presents the framework of our econometric model for measuring the efficiency and 
identifying the effects of governance forms.  The fourth section describes the data and details on 
variable construction.  The empirical results and a discussion of the findings are given in the fifth 
section. The last section summarizes the study and considers further research needs. 
LITERATURE SURVEY AND GOVERNANCE FORMS OF 
NORTH AMERICAN AIRPORTS
Literature on Airport Ownership, Governance Structure, and Firm Performance
Since the 1990s, the momentum to privatize airports has been gaining strength around the world.  The 
privatization of airport ownership is usually accompanied by some form of economic regulations, 
including price regulations. The issue of full and partial privatization and associated economic 
regulation of airports has attracted a wide range of researchers to measure and analyze airport 
efficiency performance. There are many studies already on this efficiency measurement: for the 
UK, Beesley (1999) and Starkie (2001); for Australia, Forsyth (2002) and Hooper et al. (2000), and 
Air Transport Research Society (2002-2011).  Oum et al. (2004), investigate 60 airports worldwide 
under different ownership forms and provide both theoretical and empirical evidence on the impact 
of different economic regulations on airport efficiency performance. Their empirical results indicate 
that privately owned airports do not necessarily achieve higher capital input productivity or total 
factor productivity than publicly owned airports do. 
However, it is not only ownership and its associated regulations that determine performance, 
but also airport governance structures themselves can have significant effects on performance. 
Gillen (2011) adopts a descriptive approach to examine the evolution of airport governance, and 
proposes that researchers consider the issue of airport governance in a two-sided framework 
(airports and airlines).1  Despite the importance of governance structure on the performance of 
airports, few studies purposely measured and analyzed the effects of governance forms on efficiency 
performance of North American airports, in particular comparing airports governed/operated by an 
airport authority vs. those governed/operated by a government branch. Although most empirical 
evidence, including Oum et al. (2008), suggests that airports operated by a port authority are less 
efficient than those run by either a government branch or an airport authority, it has not yet been 
clearly determined how the airports operated by the latter two governance forms differ in their 
efficiency performances. 
Some studies argue that the difference in efficiency between airports operated by the two 
governance forms (an airport authority vs. a government branch) is negligible in North America. 
For example, Oum et al. (2006) examined the impact of six different ownership/governance forms 
on the variable input productivity performance of 116 airports worldwide and found, among other 
findings, there is no significant difference in efficiency performance of airports operated by an airport 
authority from those operated by a government branch. On the other hand, other studies such as 
Craig et al. (2005) and Oum et al. (2008) detect a better efficiency performance of airports operated 
by an airport authority. Oum et al. (2008) compare the efficiency of airports owned/operated by 
seven different governance forms based on a panel data of 109 airports worldwide.2 Based solely 
on U.S. airport data, Craig et al. (2005) find results consistent with Oum et al. (2008) that, in term 
of technical efficiency, the airports operated by airport authorities outperform those operated by 
government branches. However, given that Craig et al. (2005) did not include non-aeronautical 
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services, it is not clear whether or not their results would have changed if they included the non-
aeronautical revenue activities as a part of outputs in view of the fact that the majority of  U.S. airports 
generate 40%-70% of their total revenues from non-aeronautical service activities. Although Zhuo 
et al. (2013) investigated the effects of U.S. airport governance forms, their analysis focused on the 
relative performances of the three alternative measurement methods: productivity index approach, 
DEA (Data Envelopment Method) approach, and stochastic frontier method approach.
Governance Forms in North American Airports
In Canada, in order to promote commercialization and efficiency into the airport sector, the 
(Canadian) Airport Authority form of governance was introduced beginning in 1992, transferring 
the responsibility for capacity planning, operation, and management of airports from the federal 
government (in fact, Transport Canada) to locally based not-for-profit corporations on long-term 
leases. These airport authorities are self-financing, not-for-profit, non-share-capital corporations 
incorporated under Canada Business Corporations Act, but do not pay income tax. Their leases are 
for 60 years with an option to renew for an additional 20 years. Although some business practices 
are controlled through the lease document, they are not subject to any special economic regulation 
through legislation.  Furthermore, the airport authorities enjoy the freedom to set the prices for 
various airport activities (e.g., parking, rent, landing aircraft, and terminal use) and determine 
service levels within the safety regulatory framework.  In addition, unlike the airport authorities in 
the United States, Canada’s airport authorities operate airports with virtually no federal assistance 
or subsidy. In fact, since they are required to make annual ground lease payments, Canadian airport 
authorities have become a source of significant general treasury revenues for the federal government.
 On the other hand, governance and ownership of airports in the United States is actually quite 
complicated as it can differ for each state. Therefore, we can only describe the general pattern that 
has emerged in the types of airport governance in the United States. It has long been the tradition 
that airports in the United States are operated by local or regional government branches (i.e., a 
division or department of aviation). Such an aviation department is usually separated from other 
departments, but often uses some functions of local government such as accounting services, 
purchasing decisions, and fire fighting services. Within an aviation department, the board of directors 
is appointed by the chief executive officer of the local government and is ultimately responsible to 
the (city) council.  Generally speaking, the board of directors in an aviation department cannot enter 
into contracts without the approval of the council, which literally owns the airport. Moreover, the 
annual budget, bond sales, and other similar measures of an aviation department also need to be 
approved by the council.
As an alternative to direct control by local/regional government, airport authorities were first 
established to assume control over public airports during the 1950s and 1960s. Unlike those in 
Canada, U.S. airport authorities are considered public agencies since they are created by the local/
regional governments that own airports. Although few airport authorities, such as the Great Orlando 
Aviation Authority and the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, lease the airport from the 
government, the majority of local/regional governments directly transferred and delegated all airport 
managerial responsibilities to an airport authority at virtually no cost or lease payment.  At large, an 
airport authority resembles an autonomous corporation with its own functional departments, such 
as finance and procurement department. While airport authorities are structured as independent and 
self-supporting institutions, the board members of an airport authority are always elected by the 
local/regional government. The board members are authorized to appoint the chief executive officer 
of an airport authority, and the board has the right to veto the authority’s decision.  Therefore, the 
local government, to a greater or lesser degree, can exercise varying levels of oversight and control 
the authority via the makeup and structure of the board. In some states, such as Florida, the elected 
public officials are allowed to serve as board members, while in other states, such as Michigan, 
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state legislatures have ruled out the elected public officials from the boards of airport authorities. 
For instance, the mayor of Orlando and other public officials are serving as the board members 
of the Great Orlando Aviation Authority, whereas the board of the Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky 
International Airport only consists of civic and business leaders.
In most of the past studies it is conventional to lump together both Canadian and U.S. airport 
authorities into the same category.  However, it is important to note that differences could occur 
between U.S. airport authorities and their Canadian counterparts. Regardless of the governance 
form, U.S. airports have developed particular contractual and financial relationships with airlines 
(their major customers) that distinguish them from airports in Canada. For instance, U.S. airports 
enter into legally binding contracts known as airport-use agreements which detail the conditions for 
the use of both airfield and terminal facilities. These contracts are negotiated between the airport and 
its airline customers. The contracts will specify the fees and rental rates an airline has to pay and the 
method by which these fees are to be calculated. Regarding sources of capital investment, many U.S. 
airports are financed partly or largely from the private sector through the bond market. Moreover, 
U.S. airports are eligible to be funded by the federal government via the Airport Improvement 
Program (AIP), which is administered by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In addition, 
while Canadian airports are not directly regulated, U.S. airports are subject to some general pricing 
rules. For instance, U.S. airports are required to set aeronautical fees so as to collect revenues that 
reflect the costs of providing services.
U.S. airport authorities are also different from their Canadian counterparts with respect to 
selection of board members. For U.S. airport authorities, board members have to be appointed by the 
state or local government that owns the airport, while the board members of an airport authority in 
Canada are generally appointed by local community organizations. However, it remains a question 
how such different selection processes affect airport efficiency performance. There is no doubt that 
politically motivated appointment of board members leaves U.S. airport authorities vulnerable to 
changes in administration and to the exertion of political influence. It is noticeable, nonetheless, that 
board members of U.S. airport authorities either serve on a voluntary basis or are paid only a small 
stipend for attending each official meeting or activity. It is therefore possible that the board members 
of a U.S. airport authority are more likely to represent the communities that the airport serves and 
thus have a strong interest in the performance of the airport.  On the other hand, the board members 
of Canadian airport authorities receive compensation for their service on the board and thus may be 
actually distant from the communities that airports serve.
While the definition of an airport authority varies, it is often noted that airport authorities 
are likely to be less liable to political interference. To a large extent, airport authorities may be 
relieved from the pressure to use various services provided by the city or county, and avoid the 
contract approval process and other constraints imposed on a government branch such as the city’s 
aviation department. Moreover, managers of airport authorities may have greater knowledge and 
expertise about the aviation industry in general and airport management in particular. In addition, it 
has been long argued that there is some potential inefficiency in procurement practices of aviation 
departments. Airports run by a government branch rely on the local government staff to make 
purchasing decisions, which often make the process longer and less efficient.  The political influence 
from local government, may prevent aviation departments from procuring services from the most 
cost effective sources. 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Different methodologies have been proposed to measure and compare airport efficiency performance. 
These methods can be broadly classified into non-parametric and parametric. Non-parametric 
methods include the partial and total factors productivity (TFP) indices, data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), and numerous forms of DEA-derivative methods.  Hooper and Hensher (1997), Nyshadham 
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and Rao (2000), Yoshida (2004), and Air Transport Research Society (2002-2011) used regression 
analysis to decompose a TFP or VFP (Variable Factor Productivity) index and further investigate 
the productive efficiency of airports from different regions, while Sarkis (2000), Gillen and Lall 
(2001), and Barros and Dieke (2007), applied a DEA method to evaluate the efficiency performance 
of airports.
The non-parametric approaches, such as TFP and DEA, readily handle a large number of input 
and output categories, more easily than they can be accommodated in econometric estimation 
methods. But econometric estimation methods, if data are available, build on established economic 
theory relationships and separate out the influences on cost and/or productivity.  Barros (2008) and 
Martin et al. (2009) used the parametric approach to investigate the cost efficiency performance 
of Spanish airports.3 In this study, we argue that it is not sufficient to simply describe airport 
performance but also to be able to assess and understand how different governance structures can 
affect it.  Hence we chose the econometric method as a preferred method to use for accomplishing 
our key objectives, to isolate the effects of different governance structures from other variable also 
affecting airport’s efficiency.
The Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) was first developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt in 
1977.  The basic empirical framework for SFA is a regression specification involving a logarithmic 
transformation that adds a positive (truncated) random error term, along with the traditional 
symmetric noise term, to capture unexplained inefficiency. We use the framework proposed by 
Battese and Coelli (1995) to estimate the frontier production (or cost) function and the inefficiency 
model simultaneously, avoiding the econometric problem of the two-steps procedure.
In the short run, if an airport tries to minimize its production cost (C) given the outputs (Q), 
variable input prices (W), and capital inputs (K), then the cost minimization frontier in a logarithmic 
form can be expressed as lnC*(Qit, Kit, Wit, t; β), where i represents airport and t represents time. 
In reality, airports may deviate from their cost minimization objective for various reasons and 
such deviations indicate the existence of inefficiency. To reflect this reality, for airport i, a positive 
random term ξTit is denoted as technical inefficiency, which indicates the deviation of airport’s actual 
cost from its efficient cost frontier. Further, since our interest centers on determining whether and/
or how governance structures can affect efficiency performance, it is assumed that the technical 
inefficiency term ξTit depends on the variables indicating airport governance form Zit, with the 
dependence expressed as ξTit(Zit; ς). Moreover, it is possible that governance structures can assert 
influence not only on airport technical inefficiency but also on allocative inefficiency primarily by 
affecting input (labor vs. non-labor) mix.  In order to reduce the complexity in estimation, the impact 
of governance structures on allocative inefficiency  is analyzed by simplifying the functional form of 
ξAit(Zit	, Wit ; ρ)  to include only the interaction terms between governance form variable Zit and input 
price variables (Wit). By applying Shephard’s lemma, this specification can identify how different 
governance forms change variable input mix. Taken together, the observed actual production cost of 
airport i at time t can be expressed as
(1) 
where,  is the deterministic kernel4 of the stochastic cost frontier, ξAit captures 
the effect of governance structures on airport variable input usage,  ξTit		≥ 0 captures the effect of 
technical inefficiency,  is the effect of the symmetric random noise term, and the 
vector β and ρ	are the parameters to be estimated.  In particular, our model includes three outputs 
in vector Qit (number of passengers q1it; number of aircraft movements q2it; and non-aeronautical 
output q3it), two variable input prices in vector Wit (labour price w1it; and price of the soft cost input5 
w2it), and three quasi-capital inputs in vector Kit	(number of runways k1it; number of gates k2it; and 
terminal size). 6
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The translog cost functional form is adopted to estimate the kernel of the stochastic cost frontier 
model.  In addition to governance structures, many other factors, such as location, are important 
with airports but beyond managerial control. Therefore, we augment the cost frontier to account for 
observed airport heterogeneity by adding two variables: percentage of international passengers in 
total passenger traffic (πit) and, Canada dummy variable (Di). In addition, since economic conditions 
of the day is the most powerful driver of changes in the air transport industry at large, a set of year 
dummies (Tt) is included in the cost frontier to reflect the impact of general economic conditions on 
airport operating cost.
As mentioned earlier, the physical measure is treated as a fixed input, i.e., the physical measure 
enters the cost frontier rather than the price of capital. However, in practice, airports may not be 
able to adjust their capacity as output changes. In order to account for the short-run disequilibrium 
adjustment in capacity, we estimate the restricted translog cost frontier, which is log-linear in the 
physical measure of capital inputs. Adjusted to these specifications, the stochastic cost frontier 
adopted in the study can be written as follows: 
(2)
where ξTit is the technical inefficiency model, which is assumed to have a non-negative half normal 
distribution as follow:
and  εcit is white noise error
εcit	~	N(0, σ2)
As the cost function must be linearly homogeneous in input prices, the following restrictions 
are imposed in the estimation of the above model: 
 
In addition, we also impose the following symmetric conditions in the estimation: 
ϕ12	=	ϕ21,   ϕ13	=	ϕ31,   ϕ23 = ϕ32,  τ12 = τ21
AIRPORT SAMPLE AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 54 airports in the United States and Canada for 
the 2002-2008 period. These airports are governed/operated by either an airport authority or 
a government branch (see the list in Appendix A). The data re compiled from various sources, 
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including the U.S. FAA (Federal Aviation Authority) and airports’ annual reports. Some data were 
obtained directly from airports. For more details on the data, the reader is referred to any annual 
issue of the ATRS Global Airport Performance Benchmarking Reports (2002-2011).  
The airport outputs commonly used in economic analysis are the number of passengers enplaned 
and deplaned, the tonnages of air cargo handled, and the number of aircraft movements (ATM or 
Air Transport Movements). The number of passengers handled is obviously the most important 
output measure for most airports. The air cargo services are generally handled by airlines, third-
party cargo handling companies or other firms who lease spaces and/or facilities from the airports. 
As a result, the airports’ rental incomes from such space/facility leases are included in the airport’s 
non-aeronautical revenue. Since most of cargo services are not operated directly by airports, we do 
not include air cargo services as a separate output for airports. Some may also argue ATM should 
not be included as an airport’s output because aircraft movements (landings and takeoffs) are the 
means by which passengers and air cargo are carried.  ATM may be considered as an intermediate 
activity required to handle passengers and cargos, given that almost all airport activities are related 
to the movement of aircraft, like most other studies, we decided to include the number of ATM as 
an output.
In addition to the outputs discussed above, airports also derive revenues from concessions, 
car parking, land and office rentals, and other numerous non-aeronautical services they provide. 
These services are not directly related to aeronautical activities in a traditional sense, but they are 
important and becoming increasingly more important source of revenues for airports. In fact, as 
shown in Figure 1, the non-aeronautical revenues account for anywhere between 30% and 85% 
of the total revenue of North American airports. Since many of the airport inputs are not separable 
between the aeronautical and the non-aeronautical activities of an airport, any productivity or 
efficiency measure that excludes the non-aeronautical services as an output would bias empirical 
results seriously against the airports generating a larger portion of their revenues from commercial 
and other non-aeronautical activities than their peers.  For this reason, we decided to include the non-
aeronautical services output as the third output.  Since non-aeronautical services include numerous 
items and activities, it is difficult to construct an “exact” price index consistent across all airports in 
different regions and over time.  Therefore, we construct the non-aeronautical output quantity index 
by deflating the total non-aeronautical revenues of an airport by the cost of living index (COLI) of 
the census metropolitan region in which the airport is located.
On the input side, we initially considered four general categories: (1) labor, which is measured 
by the number of full-time equivalent employees who work for and are paid for by an airport 
operator; (2) purchased goods and materials; (3) purchased services, including those contracted 
out to external parties; and (4) capital, which consists of various facilities and infrastructure. In 
practice, however, few airports provide separate expense accounts for input categories (2) and (3). 
We therefore combine them to form a single input category (henceforth referred to as “the soft cost 
input”). Since airports’ operating expenses are measured in different currencies and are subject to 
very different price levels depending on location of the airport, again we adopt the COLI as the 
proxy for the soft cost input price index, and create the soft cost input quantity index by deflating 
the soft cost input expenses by the COLI. Moreover, as the proxies for capital input, we consider 
three physical measures of capacity: the number of runways, the number of gates, and the terminal 
size (measured in square meters).
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of our data on the airports operated by a government 
branch and by an airport authority for selected years. The table shows: (a) all of the outputs and proxy 
capital measures show that, overall, the airports operated by airport authorities are smaller than the 
airports operated by the government branches; (b) on average, the labor cost shares of the airports 
operated by airport authorities are higher than the airports operated by government branches; and 
(c) the airports operated by airport authorities have higher shares of international passengers in their 
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total passengers and also generate a higher share of total revenues from non-aeronautical revenue as 
compared with airports operated by government branches.
Table 1: Summary Data for Comparing Between Two Groups of Airports
(The numbers in parentheses are standard errors)
  
Airports Operated 
by Government Branch  
Airports Operated 
by Airport Authority  
2002 2005 2008 2002 2005 2008 
Output Measures              
Number of Passengers (million)  23 (19) 27 (22) 28 (23) 14(12) 15(14) 15(12) 
Number of Aircraft Movements(000's) 328 (221) 347 (251) 349(245) 245(162) 242(160) 222(134) 
Non-Aeronautical Revenue  
74(51) 79 (56) 91 (69) 52(39) 61(46) 75(75) (million COLI deflated $) 
Proxy Capital Measures             
Number of Runways 3.4(1.2) 3.5 (1.3) 3.6 (1.2) 3.2(1.1) 3.3(1.2) 3.3(1.2) 
Number of Gates  73 (46) 79(47) 79(48) 59(42) 58(39) 64(41) 
Terminal Size (000's Squared Meter) 200 (183) 224 (195) 212(159) 121(102) 126(100) 133(10) 
Variable Inputs' Prices              
Wage (000's US$) 58 (16) 69(21) 86(27) 55(12) 67(13) 84(19) 
Soft Cost Input Price Index) 
( COLI: cost of living index) 1.04(0.2) 1.14(0.2) 1.26(0.3) 0.99(0.1) 1.08(0.2) 1.18(0.2) 
Variable Inputs' Share             
Labour Cost Share (%)  39%(10) 40%(11) 38%(11) 46%(10) 42%(10) 43%(9) 
Other Characteristics             
Percentage of International Passengers (%) 8%(11) 8%(11) 7%(12) 10%(14) 10%(15) 11%(15) 
Share of Non-Aeronautical Revenue (%) 49%(11) 49%(12) 50%(11) 52%(13) 54%(12) 56%(13) 
              
Percentage             
Canadian Airports (%)       26% 26% 25% 
US Airports (%)       74 74 75 
              
Number of Airports in the sample 26 25 24 27 27 28 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Table 2 presents two alternative stochastic cost frontier models estimated by the Gauss maximum-
likelihood computer program.  In Model I, we postulate there is no difference between Canadian and 
U.S. airport authorities; i.e., the two countries’ airport authorities perform identically. Therefore, in 
Model I, all sample airports are classified into two categories: (1) airports operated by a government 
branch and (2) airports operated by an airport authority.  In Model II, we separate Canadian and 
U.S. airport authorities: i.e., the airports governed/operated by Canadian airport authorities perform 
differently from those governed/operated by U.S. airport authorities. In other words, in Model II we 
distinguish our efficiency models among three types of airport governance forms: (1) a government 
branch; (2) a U.S. airport authority; and (3) a Canadian airport authority.
Part A of Table 2 reports the estimation results for the kernel of the translog variable cost 
functions, including the effects of airport characteristics on variable costs. Part B reports the 
estimation results of the Technical Inefficiency Model; i.e., impacts of governance forms on 
technical efficiency of the airports which are of our particular interest in this paper.
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Table 2: Stochastic Cost Frontier Estimation Results
 
A.  Estimation Results for Translog Variable Cost Function 
 Model 1  Model II  
Parameters Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
 α    (constant) -0.934 -3.79** -0.936 -3.47** 
 ω1 (Year 2003) 0.043 3.29** 0.040 3.21** 
 ω2 (Year 2004) 0.022 0.94 0.021 0.87 
 ω3 (Year 2005) 0.048 1.89* 0.044 1.72* 
 ω4 (Year 2006) 0.066 2.82** 0.059 2.46** 
 ω5 (Year 2007) 0.085 3.01** 0.082 2.78** 
 ω6 (Year 2008) 0.117 2.61** 0.115 2.50** 
 γ   (%International ) 0.684 2.34** 0.652 2.32** 
 φ  (Canadian dummy) -0.241 -1.13 -0.236 -1.12 
Coefficients of Outputs 
 β1 (non-aeronautical output) 0.325 3.36** 0.338 3.60** 
 β2 (passengers ) 0.290 3.21** 0.269 3.18** 
 β3 (aircraft movements) 0.081 1.17 0.077 1.21 
Coefficients of Proxy Capital Measures 
 λ1  (runway) 0.088 0.50 0.095 0.61 
 λ2  (number of gates) 0.108 1.05 0.111 1.06 
 λ3  (terminal size) 0.017 0.26 0.013 0.21 
Coefficients of input prices 
 δ1   (wage ) 0.394 2.99** 0.416 2.91** 
Coefficient for  Interactions between Governance Structure and Input Price 
 ρ1 (Government − branch ∗  wage)  -0. 069 -1.57 -0.058 -1.29 
ρ2 (Canadian Airport Authority ∗  wage)   0.014 0.31 
Coefficients of Interactions among Outputs 
 ϕ11  (non-aeronautical * non-aeronautical) 0.361 2.33** 0.356 2.43** 
 ϕ22  (passenger * passenger) 0.276 0.61 0.243 0.54 
 ϕ33 (aircraft movements * aircraft 
movements) -0.241 -0.88 -0.270 -1.02 
 ϕ12  (non-aeronautical * passenger ) -0.247 -0.97 -0.232 -0.93 
 ϕ13 (non-aeronautical * aircraft movements ) -0.075 -0.29 -0.026 -0.17 
 ϕ23 (passenger *aircraft movements) 0.044 0.24 0.083 0.31 
Coefficients of Interaction between Input Prices 
  τ12   (wage *wage ) 0.172 0.76 0.185 0.97 
Coefficients of Interaction between Outputs and Input Prices 
  ϑ11   (non − aeronautical ∗  wage )   -0.056 -0.28 -0.055 -0.29 
  ϑ21   (passenger * wage) -0.393 -1.48 -0.305 -1.11 
  ϑ31   (aircraft movement * wage) 0.511 2.30** 0.505 2.18** 
 B. Estimation Results for the Technical Inefficiency Model (Impacts of Governance Form) 
Parameters   Coefficient t-statistics 
ς0(Constant)  -0.798 -3.1** -0.766 -3.04* 
ς1(Government -branch dummy)  0.141 1.75* 0.145 1.77** 
ς2(Canadian Airport Authority dummy)   0.028 0.22 
σz
2 + σ2 (Variance Parameter)  0.058 - 0.061 - 
σZ
Z
σZ
2 + σ2
 (Ratio of the Variances)  0.744 - 0.755 - 
Log-likelihood value                                                  264.39                                             266.12 
** Significant at 𝛼𝛼 = 0.05; * Significant at 𝛼𝛼 = 0.10 
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Hypotheses Tests for Model Choice 
Does Canada’s airport authorities’ efficiency performance differ from that of U.S. airport 
authorities? To answer this question, we need to compare Model I and Model II in Table 2.  Model 
II includes two more parameters than Model I, namely, ρ2 (Canadian Airport Authority * wage) 
in the allocative efficiency part A, and ς2 (Canadian Airport Authority dummy) in the technical 
efficiency part B.  
The t-statistics for both of these parameter estimates indicate that neither of the following 
two hypotheses can be rejected when we test each of the following two hypotheses one at a time 
sequentially:
Ho.	ρ2 (Canadian Airport Authority * wage) = 0 	H1	ρ2 ≠	0
Ho.	ς2 (Canadian Airport Authority dummy) = 0		H1		ς2 	≠	0
The following joint hypotheses on both homogeneous allocative inefficiency parameters and 
technical inefficiency parameters for U.S. and Canadian airport authorities can be tested using the 
asymptotic likelihood ratio test criterion: 7
Ho	 ρ2 = ς2 = 0
Since the computed Chi-square statistic,  
is much smaller than the critical value (5.99) of the Chi-square distribution with 2 df at 5% level, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that both allocative inefficiency and  technical inefficiency parameters 
are identical between U.S. and Canadian airport authorities. In other words,  this Likelihood Ratio 
(LR) test result shows that Model I (Canadian airport authorities are identical to U.S. airport 
authorities in terms of  both the allocative inefficiency and technical inefficiency parameters in the 
model) could not be rejected in favor of Model II (Canadian airport authorities have distinctly 
different inefficiency parameters from the U.S. airport authority model). Although some experts 
argue that Canadian airport authorities differ from their U.S. counterparts in terms of their relationship 
with airlines, financial sources available, and selection of board members, and thus should be 
considered as different types of airport governance, our test results show that as far as their allocative 
inefficiency in terms of using labor-soft cost input mix and technical inefficiency are concerned, 
Canadian and U.S. airport authorities appear to be identical. Therefore, in the rest of this paper we 
will focus on discussing our empirical results mostly based on Model I.  Model II will be referred to 
occasionally when we need to discuss potential differences on the efficiency performance between 
Canadian and the U.S. airport authorities, albeit they are not statistically significantly different at 5% 
level.
Does the non-neutrally input augmenting allocative inefficiency specification in our translog 
cost function improve our cost measurement? In Model I of Table 2, the parameter estimate ρ1 
(for government branch dummy * wage) is only marginally significantly from zero only at 12% 
level, but not significant at 5% level. The negative coefficient, -0.069, implies that there is evidence, 
albeit weak, that the labor cost (soft cost input) share at the airports operated by a government 
branch (an airport authority) is, on average, 6.9% less (more) than a similar airport operated by 
an airport authority (a government branch). The airports operated by a government branch may 
be forced to outsource more of their services, such as police and fire fighting services, and ground 
access services. (a part of soft cost input) to government departments.
Does our stochastic frontier technical inefficiency model significantly improve accuracy of 
technical inefficeincy measurement? In both Models I and II, the ς0 (constant) coefficient in the 
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technical inefficiency model is statistically very significant.  This implies that the stochastic frontier 
specification with the half normal truncated distribution of technical inefficiency significantly 
improves the measurement of inefficiency over the model without the half normal inefficiency 
specification. Similarly, the coefficient ς1 (government branch dummy) is statistically significantly 
different from zero at 5% level in both Models I and II.  This implies that specifying our stochastic 
frontier technical inefficiency model differently between the airports operated by airport authorities 
and those operated by government branches has significantly improved the accuracy of technical 
inefficiency measurement. The coefficient estimate, 0.141, implies that, on average, the technical 
inefficiency for airports operated by government branches is about 14% larger than those operated 
by airport authorities.   
Results of Joint Hypotheses Tests 
Table 3 presents the test statistics for and the results of further likelihood ratio tests on the following 
three important joint hypotheses:
(a) H0: ς0= ς1= 0: The conventional econometric model without stochastic frontier technical 
inefficiency component and without differential technical inefficiency effects between the 
airport authority and the government branch 
(b) H0: ρ1= ς0= ς1= 0: The model without specification of stochastic frontier, differential 
allocative inefficiency or differential technical inefficiency between the two forms of 
governance
(c) H0: ρ1= ς1= 0: The effects of the differential allocative inefficiency and differential technical 
inefficiency between the airport authority and the government branch are jointly zero;  i.e., 
ς0 ≠	0, but	ρ1= ς1= 0.
Table 3: Hypothesis Tests on Stochastic Cost Frontier Model I
Based on the likelihood ratio test statistics reported in Table 3, all three hypotheses are rejected 
at least at 5% level of significance in favor of the respective alternative hypotheses. It is worth 
pointing out that although the allocative inefficiency parameter ρ1 was only marginally significant 
in our stand-alone test, the null hypotheses of zero coefficients were strongly rejected at 5% level 
in the joint tests (b) and (c) above with the technical inefficiency differential between government 
branch and airport authority management cases. This implies that when measuring efficiencies for 
North American airports, it is worth incorporating both the allocative inefficiency and the technical 
inefficiency modules in stochastic frontier models as we have done in this paper.8     
Empirical Results from the Chosen Model
Effects of airport governance structure on airport input mix. The impact of the airport governance 
structures on variable input usage is identified via the coefficient of the labor price (wage) interacted 
with the government branch dummy variable in Model I.  While the coefficient was only marginally 
significant at 12% level when we tested the single coefficient by itself, it was strongly significant 
when it was jointly tested with the technical inefficiency parameters.  The value of the coefficient, 
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-0.069, implies that on average the airports operated by a government branch tend to have about 
6.9% lower labor cost share (equivalently, 6.9% higher soft cost input share) than those operated by 
an airport authority (base case in our allocative inefficiency specification).9   
This result is partly because many airports operated by a government branch do not have some 
functional departments (e.g., accounting and security) and use these services supplied by the local 
government departments. Partly as a result of the procurement provisions of the local government, 
airports run by a government branch may not purchase services from the most cost-effective source, 
and thus tend to have a higher soft cost share because of higher outsourcing activities. 
Effects of airport governance structure on technical inefficiency. Part B of Table 2 shows the 
effect of governance structures on airport technical inefficiency. The coefficient for airports operated 
by a government branch is positive and significant at the 10% and 5% levels in Model I and II, 
respectively.  Our results show that the airports run by a government branch are on average 14% 
technically less efficient than those run by a Canadian or U.S. airport authority.  Consistent with the 
results obtained by Craig et al. (2005) and Oum et al. (2008), our finding confirms that independent 
institutions, such as the airport authorities, achieve a higher efficiency performance since they enjoy 
sufficient freedom to operate airports in a commercially oriented manner. While separated from 
other government departments, the aviation branch operates under the general requirements of the 
local government bureaucracy and thus is influenced by other political activities. Such factors may 
hinder efficient airport operations.
Canadian vs. U.S. airport authorities. As discussed already, our result shows there is not any 
statistically significant efficiency difference between airports operated by U.S. airport authorities 
and those run by Canadian airport authorities. Casual commentators normally favor Canadian airport 
authorities over U.S. airport authorities since politically motivated appointment of board members 
leaves U.S. airport authorities vulnerable to political influence on airports’ business decisions. Our 
empirical results do not support such argument. 
The effects of airport characteristics on costs and/or efficiency. The stochastic frontier cost 
Models I and II reported in Table 2 give remarkably similar results on the effects of various airport 
characteristics on the variable cost frontier. All the parameter estimates of the two models have 
identical signs. All the coefficients statistically significant in Model I are also statistically significant 
in Model II. Since Model I (Canadian airport authorities are identical to U.S. airport authorities 
in terms of both the allocative inefficiency and technical inefficiency parameters in the model) 
could not be rejected in favor of Model II (Canadian airport authorities have distinctly different 
inefficiency parameters from the U.S. airport authority model), only the parameter estimates of 
Model I are used to describe below the effect of each airport characteristics on the cost frontier.
Non-aeronautical output is one of the most statistically significant variables, and has a positive 
coefficient of about 0.325. This indicates that a 1% increase in non-aeronautical service output, 
holding other variables constant, causes total variable cost to increase by only about 0.325%. The 
strong statistical significance of this coefficient implies that omission of non-aeronautical services 
output in measuring airport cost and/or efficiency would cause a serious bias on the empirical results 
by committing model specification error.  Figure 1 shows that although the share of non-aeronautical 
revenue in the airport’s total revenue varies across our sample airports, the average value is well 
over 50%.  This implies that, for an average airport, a 10% increase in non-aeronautical revenue 
would increase an airport’s total revenue by 5% while increasing costs only by 3.25%. Therefore, 
omission of non-aeronautical revenue would lead to over-estimation of costs (or equivalently, under-
estimation of efficiency or productivity) for the airports whose management focuses on generating a 
higher percentage of total revenues from non-aeronautical services, including commercial services.
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Figure 1: Share of Non-Aeronautical Revenue for Sample Airports in 2008
The three proxy capital stock measures (the number of runways, number of gates and terminal 
size) are neither individually nor jointly statistically significant in our cost function. The inclusion 
of these proxy variables does not seem to help improve our cost function. This means that although 
it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to construct a capital stock index consistently comparable 
across all airports in different jurisdictions with different accounting systems and taxes/subsidies, 
there is a need to continue with the effort for constructing such capital stock series.
Most of the year, dummy variables (base year 2002) are individually statistically significant 
and positive, and all year dummy variables together are jointly statistically significant in our cost 
function. These positive coefficients indicate upward shifts of the cost frontier in the post-2001 
period even after controlling for the effects of all of the variables included in our model.  This may 
be because airports in North America had to bear the ever-increasing security costs in the post 9/11 
period.
The percentage of international traffic has a statistically significant positive coefficient, meaning 
that the airport in which international passengers account for a larger share of total traffic faces more 
upward pressure on airport operating costs than a similar airport with a lower share of international 
traffic. The parameter estimate, 0.68, indicates that airports with one percentage point higher 
international passenger share are expected to have 0.68% higher operating costs, ceteris paribus. 
Canada country dummy has a negative coefficient but is not statistically significant. This implies 
that airports in Canada and the United States have similar cost structures. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study has found that the choice between the two dominant forms of airport governance in 
Canada and the United States, i.e., airport authorities vs. government branches, has a significant 
effect on cost efficiency performance of the airport.  In particular, our findings indicate that airports 
operated by an airport authority outperform those operated by a government branch by, on average, 
14% in terms of technical efficiency.  This result provides new supporting evidence for the argument 
that the governance form in which management can exercise a greater degree of autonomy and 
face less political pressure are more likely to improve efficiency performance.  Furthermore, by 
modeling the interrelationship between governance form and airport variable input usage, we found 
that the airports run by a government branch tend to have a higher share of the soft cost input cost 
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(including outsourcing cost) than those run by an airport authority.  Since little attention has been 
paid to the influence of governance forms on an airport’s input mix, this paper provides a greater 
account of the impact of governance forms on efficiency performance, and offers a new platform for 
improving cost frontier specifications for future studies. 
Estimation of the hypotheses tests led us to conclude: (a) The efficiency performance and cost 
structure of the airports operated by Canadian airport authorities are not statistically different from 
those operated by U.S. airport authorities; (b) our stochastic frontier specification of our cost model 
significantly improved the accuracy of efficiency measurement, suggesting to future research that it 
is worth incorporating both the allocative inefficiency and the technical inefficiency modules in the 
stochastic cost frontier models for measuring airport efficiency.
In addition, our results also show that it is important to include non-aeronautical services as 
a part of airport outputs because, otherwise, empirical results on cost efficiency would get biased 
against the airports whose management focuses on increasing commercial and other non-aeronautical 
revenues.
The empirical constructs of the current study offer a useful starting point for a more in-depth 
analysis of the effects of airport governance forms.  To further extend our study, it is possible 
to formulate more flexible models that account for the presence of observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity across individual airports. Due to estimation problems, we had to simplify our model 
structure dealing with the interrelationship between governance forms and airport input mix, 
which clearly is one of the potential future improvements in model specification and estimation. In 
addition, the incorporation of the nature of contractual relationships between airports and airlines 
(major customers) is another area that warrants further research.  The complex specification required 
for such work, however, may increase the computational complexity and difficulty. 
Endnotes
1. A growing number of economists argue that the two-sided platforms (airports and airlines) 
internalize the “demand externalities” that each agent in isolation cannot internalize efficiently. 
Rochet and Tirole (2006) define the two-sided markets as a situation in which the volume of 
transactions between end-users depends not only on the overall level of the fees charged by the 
platform but also on the way in which the transactions are structured and governed. 
2. By estimating a stochastic cost frontier via a Bayesian approach, they found that the airports 
run by an airport authority perform far more efficiently than those operated by a government 
branch in North America.
3. Airport studies of efficiency utilizing parametric and non-parametric approaches are reviewed 
and summarized in Liebert and Niemeier (2010).
4. Deterministic kernel is the costs of a fully efficient institution in absence of random factors.
5. The soft cost input consists of all costs and expenses other than personnel costs and capital 
expenditure.
6. Since we believe there is no way of creating consistent measures of airport capital inputs or 
capital stocks comparable across airports in different jurisdictions, we decide to use these three 
physical measures of capital stocks as quasi-capital input measures.
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7. Let θ  be a vector of parameters to be estimated, and H0 specify hypothesized restrictions on 
these parameters. Let be the ML estimator of θ obtained without imposing the parameter 
restrictions and be the constrained ML estimator. If we let and be the 
likelihood functions evaluated at these two estimates, then it is well known that the following 
likelihood ratio test statistics (λ) is asymptotically Chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of restrictions imposed in the null hypothesis H0, provided H0 is true. 
 
8. Furthermore, the ratio of variances reported at the bottom of Table 2 indicates that about 74% of 
the total variation is accounted for by our technical inefficiency model (Part B in Table 2). This 
is another indicator that the incorporation of our technical inefficiency frontier in our translog 
cost function was a worthwhile practice.
9. By applying Shephard’s lemma to Model I  we can give this interpretation of the coefficient ρ1.
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APPENDIX A:  List of  Sample Airports, 2002-2008
North America - United States 
Code Airport Name Governance Structures
1 ABQ Albuquerque International Airport Government Branch
2 ALB Albany International Airport Airport Authority
3 ATL Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport Government Branch
4 AUS Austin Bergstrom Airport Government Branch
5 BNA Nashville International Airport Airport Authority
6 BWI Baltimore Washington International Airport Government Branch
7 CLE Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport Government Branch
8 CLT Charlotte Douglas International Airport Government Branch
9 CVG Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport Airport Authority
10 DCA Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport Airport Authority
11 DEN Denver International Airport Government Branch
12 DFW Dallas/ Fort Worth International Airport Airport Authority
13 DTW Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport Airport Authority
14 FLL Fort Lauderdale Hollywood International Airport Airport Authority
15 HNL Honolulu International Airport Government Branch
16 IAD Washington Dulles International Airport Airport Authority
17 IAH Houston-Bush International Airport Government Branch
18 IND Indianapolis International Airport Airport Authority
19 JAX Jacksonville International Airport Airport Authority
20 LAS Las Vegas McCarran International Airport Government Branch
21 LAX Los Angeles International Airport Government Branch
22 MCI Kansas City International Airport Government Branch
23 MCO Orlando International Airport Airport Authority
24 MDW Chicago Midway Airport Government Branch
25 MEM Memphis International Airport Airport Authority
26 MIA Miami International Airport Government Branch
27 MKE General Mitchell International Airport Government Branch
28 MSP Minneapolis /St. Paul International Airport Airport Authority
29 MSY Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport Government Branch
30 ONT Ontario International Airport Government Branch
31 ORD Chicago O’Hare International Airport Government Branch
32 PHL Philadelphia International Airport Government Branch
33 PHX Phoenix Sky Harbour International Airport Government Branch
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34 PIT Pittsburgh International Airport Airport Authority
35 RDU Raleigh-Durham International Airport Airport Authority
36 RIC Richmond International Airport Airport Authority
37 RNO Reno/Tahoe International Airport Airport Authority
38 SAN San Diego International Airport Airport Authority
39 SAT San Antonio International Airport Government Branch
40 SDF Louisville International Airport Airport Authority
41 SFO San Francisco International Airport Government Branch
42 SJC Norman Y. Mineta San Jose International Airport Government Branch
43 SLC Salt Lake City International Airport Government Branch
44 SMF Sacramento International Airport Government Branch
45 SNA John Wayne Orange County Airport Government Branch
46 STL St. Louis-Lambert International Airport Airport Authority
47 TPA Tampa International Airport Airport Authority
North America - Canada
Code Airport Name Governance Structures
48 YEG Edmonton International Airport Airport Authority
49 YHZ Halifax International Airport Airport Authority
50 YOW Ottawa International Airport Airport Authority
51 YUL Montreal-Pierre Elliot Trudeau international Airport Airport Authority
52 YVR Vancouver International Airport Airport Authority
53 YWG Winnipeg International Airport Airport Authority
54 YYC Calgary International Airport Airport Authority
Qi (Mia) Zhao	received	her	MSc	in	business	administration	and	logistics	from	the	University	of	
British	Columbia.
Yap Yin Choo	 is	 on	 the	 faculty	 in	 Operations	 Management	 at	 British	 Columbia	 Institute	 of	
Technology.	His	research	and	teaching	interests	are	in	the	areas	of	economics,	efficiency,	and	policy	
analysis	in	financial	and	air	transport	industries.
Tae Oum	is	the	UPS	Foundation	chair	professor	at	Sauder	School	of	Business,	University	of	British	
Columbia,	 and	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Air	 Transport	 Research	 Society	 (ATRS).	 He	 serves	 on	 the	
editorial	 boards	of	 12	 international	 journals	on	 transport/logistics	and	 the	 economics	field.	His	
research	and	teaching	interests	are	in	the	areas	of	economics,	management,	and	policy	analysis	in	
the	transport/logistics	sectors.
APPENDIX A:  List of  Sample Airports, 2002-2008 (continued)
